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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRMAN MILLINER and I 
GEORGE A. BURCH, I 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, I 
vs. 1 
ELMER FOX AND CO., DON A. ) C a s e N o - 2 1 4 8 0 3 
STRINGHAM, LARRY M. FOL-1 
LETT, and STRINGHAM & FOL-V 
LETT, A professional corporation, 1 
Defendants/Respondents. I 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's judg-
ment. 
FACTS 
1. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants 
relief for negligent misrepresentation and also relief 
under the Utah Securities Act. 
2. The Plaintiffs Allege: 
a. That the defendant Elmer Fox & Com-
pany were accountants for a Utah corporation, 
Commercial Liquidators, Inc. 
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b. Also the defendants Don A. Stringham, 
Larry M. Follett, and Stringham and Follett, a 
professional corporation; were lawyers for that 
same Utah corporation. 
c. Plaintiffs purchased stock in that corpo-
ration. 
3. In making their investment decision, the plain-
tiffs relied on certain financial statements prepared by 
Elmer Fox & Company and certain documents prepared 
by the defendants Stringham and Follett, for filing with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
4. After the purchase of securities in Commercial 
Liquidators, Inc., the plaintiffs discovered the falsity of 
those financial statements and securities filings. 
5. Thereafter, the market price of the security pur-
chased by plaintiff fell drastically causing complete loss 
of value. 
6. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants were 
negligent in their preparation of those financial state-
ments and securities filings. 
7. After service of the summons and complaint, the 
defendants moved for dismissal under Eule 12(b)(6) 
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of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state 
a claim and Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join an indis-
pensable party. 
8. At the hearing on the motion, the defendants 
argued: 
a. That there was no privity on contract 
between the defendants and the plaintiffs and 
therefore the complaint failed to state a claim. 
b. That the Securities Act Section relied on 
by plaintiff, 61-1-1 Utah Code Ann. (1953) does 
not provide a private cause of action being a 
criminal statute. 
c. That Commercial Liquidators, Inc., the 
company in which plaintiffs purchased securities, 
was an indispensable party. 
9. After the hearing, the trial court granted the 
defendants' motion to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT IS NOT AN ELEMENT IN 
AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT PROFESSIONAL 
MISREPRESENTATION. 
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The initial starting point of the history of the law of 
negligent misrepresentation by a professional is Glanzer 
v. Shepherd, 223 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275. In Glanzer the 
defendant was a public weigher. The plaintiff contracted 
with a third person to purchase beans for the price par-
tially based upon the weight determination by the de-
fendant. Although the plaintiff was not in privity with 
a public weigher, the court held that the weigher was 
liable for moneys that were overpaid. The court stated 
that negligent misrepresentation as to weight would 
grant plaintiff an action since it was the expectation of 
the public weigher that his certificate was made for the 
purpose of a certain transaction that would be relied 
upon by a third party; i.e., the plaintiff. 
Mr. Justice Cardozo, in the famous opinion of Ultra 
Mares Corporation v. George A. Touche, et al., 255 N.Y. 
178, 174 N.E. 444 distinguished the ruling in Glanzer. In 
Ultra Mares, the plaintiff was a corporation that was 
loaning money to Fred Stern and Company, Inc. In so 
doing the plaintiff insisted on examining and approving 
a balance sheet certified by public accountants. Stern 
and Company tendered to the plaintiffs balance sheets 
that were certified by the defendant accountants. The 
court found that the audit was negligently made and, 
therefore, the issue is whether or not negligence was 
wrong to the plaintiff; not being in privity of contract. 
Judge Cardozo stated: "The assault upon the citadel 
of privity is proceeding these days apace." How far the 
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in roads shall extend is now a favorite subject of juridi-
cal discussion. (Citations omitted) . . . The court dis-
tinguished Glanzer on the ground that in Glanzer the in-
formation was furnished primarily for a third person 
while in Ultra Mares the accounting information was 
furnished primarily for Fred Stern and Company. In 
the case where the professional misrepresentation is 
furnished primarily for the purpose of a person in privi-
ty, Cardozo held that action for negligence would not lie 
to third persons. The court in Ultra Mares stated: 
"If there has been neither reckless misstate-
ments or insincere profession of opinion, that only 
an honest blunder, the insuing liability for negli-
gence is one that is bounded by the contract and to 
be enforced between the parties by whom the con-
tract is made unless a statement was made regard-
ing the particular transaction and the defendant 
knew such at the time they prepared the audit. To 
creditors and investors to whom the employer 
exhibited and the certificate, the defendants owed 
a like duty to make it without fraud, since there 
was notice in the circumstances of its making that 
the employer did not intend to keep it to himself." 
In the present case the complaint alleged both gross 
negligence and the defendant's knowledge that the state-
ments were to be made for the use of third persons in 
plaintiff's position. 
In the wake of Ultra Mares, a great deal has been 
written and decided about an accountant's liability to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
persons other than his employer for damages resulting 
from the reliance upon erroneous information in the 
accountant's report. 
The next important case arising after Ultra Mares, 
is Busch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (1968). 
There the court reviewed Glanzer and Ultra Mares and 
stated: 
"The wisdom of the decision in Ultra Mares 
has been doubted. (Citations omitted) and this 
court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent 
reliant party be forced to carry the weighty bur-
den of an accountant's professional malpractice? 
Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and 
fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting 
profession, which can pass the cost of insuring 
against risk onto its customers, who can in turn 
pass the cost on to the entire consuming public? 
Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate 
the cautionary techniques of the accounting pro-
fession? For those reaso-ns it appears to this 
Court that the decision in Ultra Mares constitutes 
an unwarranted inroad upon the principle that 
'the risk reasonably to be preceived defines the 
duty to be obeyed.' " Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 
248 N X 339, 344,162 N.E. 99,100. 
The same sort of position has been taken with respect 
to lawyers' liability. In DiaJcanja v. Irving, 4 Cal. 2d 647, 
320 p. 2d 16 (1958), the court stated: 
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"The determination that in a specific case 
that the defendant will be held liable to third per-
sons not in privity is a matter of policy and in-
volves the balancing of various factors, among 
which are the extent to which the transaction, was 
intended to affect plaintiff, the foreseeability of 
harm, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injuries 
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defend-
ant's conduct and the policy of preventing future 
harm." 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts provides: 
"One who in the course of his business, pro-
fession, or employment, or in a transaction in 
which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false 
information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for 
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable 
reliance upon the information, if he fails to exer-
cise reasonable care or competence in obtaining 
or communicating the information." 
The liability is limited to loss suffered by one of the 
persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to 
supply it. Restatement (2nd) of Torts, Section 552. 
Thus it would appear that the state of the law is that 
an accountant or lawyer is liable for misrepresentation 
amounting to fraud: recklessness, and even negligence if 
it were forseeable at the time of the negligent misrepre-
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sentation that such would be communicated to the plain-
tiff and that the plaintiff relied thereon. You will note 
in the present case that the plaintiff has alleged gross 
negligence, and also that the defendants knew that the 
false information they were to supply was being used in 
connection with securities transaction and that the plain-
tiff relied thereon and purchased securities and such 
caused them damage. Consequently, under the present 
state of the law the plaintiff's complaint states a cause 
of action and lack of privity is not a defense. 
POINT II 
SECTION 61-1-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED CRE-
ATES A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Section 61-1-1 provides: 
False statements unlawful—it is unlawful for 
any person in connection with the offer, sale, or 
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly. 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to fraud 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in light of the circumstances under which they are 
made, not misleading, or 
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(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business in which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Section 61-1-22 provides for a cause of action for viola-
tions of certain other sections of the Utah Uniform Se-
curities Act, but does not provide for a private cause of 
action for violations of 61-1-1. It was the defendants' 
position that the legislative ennumeration of certain 
causes of action without mentioning 61-1-1, created a 
exclusion of a private cause of action under 61-1-1. It was 
the plaintiff's position that the violation of 61-1-1, being 
a criminal violation and also giving ground for an in-
junction by the state, would also create an action for 
person who was damaged by defendants' violation of 
that section. 
All of the ennumerated private causes of action in the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act provides for an action 
against a person who is either a purchaser or seller of 
securities. In none of the ennumerated sections, is there 
an action granted against a person who aids or abets an 
unlawful sale. Thus, if we accept the defendants' posi-
tion, the persons such as the plaintiff in this case has no 
action against the false maker of financial statements 
or other false statements which induce plaintiff to pur-
chase securities as long as the maker of the false state-
ments was not the seller. 
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The same problem arose with respect section 10b of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and 
Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. In 
both instances there is no ennnmeration of a private 
cause of action but merely a criminal wrong for the vio-
lation of the Section. Federal courts had no problem 
construing those sections to give rise to a private cause 
of action. The words in those sections are substantially 
identical to Section 61-1-1 of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Exchange Act. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT FAIL TO JOIN INDISPENS-
ABLE PARTY. 
"[T]he ultimate question whether several de-
fendants may be sued individually or must be sued 
collectively depends upon the question, which 
must first be determined, whether the obligation 
of the transaction out of which the claim arise is 
joint, joint and several, or merely several. Parties 
59 Am. Jur. 2d Section 5, 348." 
"[I]n indispensable parties may be defined as 
those parties whose interests in the subject matter 
of the suit and relief are so bound up wih those 
of the other parties that their legal presence as 
parties to the proceedings is an absolute necessity. 
Parties 59 Am. Jur. 2d Section 13, 359. Thus, it 
is declared as a general rule that an indispensable 
party is one whose interest in the subject matter 
is such that if he is not joined a complete and 
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efficient determination of the equities in rights 
between the other parties is not possible; where 
that an indispensable party is one having an inter-
est in the controversy of such a nature that a final 
decree cannot be made without effecting that in-
terest. Id at 359-360." 
"A person who has no interest in the contro-
versy between the parties in action is, of course, 
not an indispensable party. Every person who has 
any interest in a controversy or subject matter of 
a suit which is seperable from the interest to the 
other parties before the court, so that it will not 
necessarily be directly or injuriously effected by 
a decree which is in complete justice between 
them, is a proper party to the suit, but he is not 
an indispensable party." 
In the present case the plaintiff has sought redress 
against the defendants on a theory of negligence. Negli-
gence alleged is the negligence of the two defendants, 
not the negligence of anyone else. Thus, although other 
persons may have an interest in the outcome of the liti-
gation, they are not indispensable parties inasmuch as 
the claims of the plaintiff arise solely out of the actions 
of the defendants, and no others. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD J. LEEDY 
Attorney for Appellants 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 309 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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